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KANT ON RECOGNIZING OUR DUTIES AS
GOD'S COMMANDS
John E. Hare

Kant both says that we should recognize our duties as God's commands, and objects to
the theological version of heteronomy, 'which derives morality from a divine and
supremely perfect will'. In this paper I discuss how these two views fit together, and in
the process I develop a notion of autonomous submission to divine moral authority. I
oppose the 'constitutive' view of autonomy proposed by J. B. Schneewind and
Christine Korsgaard. I locate Kant's objection to theological heteronomy against the
background of Crusius's divine command theory, and I compare Kant's views about
divine authority and human political authority.

1. Kant on Religion and Morality
I am going to focus on Kant's view that we should recognize our duties
as God's commands, and on how this fits with his more familiar objection
in the Groundwork to the theological version of heteronomy, 'which derives
morality from a divine and supremely perfect will'. But before we get to
that, I want to make a general point about Kant's view of the relation
between morality and the Christian faith. We have tended to secularize
Kant in a way that distorts the meaning of the texts. There has been a tendency to see modern philosophy as teleological, headed towards the death
of God and the death of metaphysics heralded by Nietzsche at the end of
the nineteenth century. The modern classics have accordingly been
trimmed to fit this model by their twentieth century admirers. What we
need to do is to recapture what I call 'the vertical dimension' of their
thought. In the case of Kant, he is, in his own phrase, a 'pure rationalist'.l
A pure rationalist is someone who 'recognizes revelation, but asserts that
to know and accept it as real is not a necessary requisite to religion.'
Implicit in this description is a distinction between two kinds of religion.
In his second preface to Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant suggests we think of revelation as two concentric circles. Historical revelation
(for example, Scripture), which is given to particular people at particular
times, belongs in the outer circle. Kant's project is to see if he can translate
the items in this outer circle into the language of the inner circle, which is
the revelation to reason, and is the same to all people at all times. Being a
pure rationalist means that the items in the outer circle are not rejected, but
they are held not to be necessary for all rational beings to come to saving
faith. They are, Kant says, vehicles of the religion within the limits of reason
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alone. He himself and his European contemporaries have been introduced
to God's requirements by this historical revelation, and Kant thinks it
important that biblical preaching should continue and be kept under discipline, so that this vehicle can be maintained. He is not, then, rejecting special revelation in favor of morality. But Kant wants to use morality to
translate as much as he can of special revelation into the language of reason. The translation exercise is going to show, if it is successful, that the
two circles are indeed concentric, which is at least to say that they are consistent with each other. More than this, a life centred in one will also be
centred in the other.2
On my reading of Kant's project, he finds that there are some items in the
outer circle which he cannot translate, but which he needs to continue to
believe in order to have morality make rational sense. Conspicuous among
these items is the belief in divine grace. Kant believes in a strong version of
the doctrine of original sin, that we are born under the dominion of the 'evil
maxim', which makes us subordinate our duty to our own happiness. Kant
also believes that we cannot by our own devices overcome this dominion,
because it already underlies all our choices. We therefore require assistance
from outside ourselves to accomplish what he calls 'the revolution of the
will', by which the ranking of happiness over duty is reversed. Kant's candidate for this outside assistance is what he caBs 'a divine supplement', and
he holds that we have to believe that this is available if we are to hold ourselves accountable to the moral law. Twentieth century exegetes have tried
to rescue Kant from these views by what I call 'cushion hermeneutics'. This
is the strategy of suggesting that he did not really mean some of the things
he says, but was saying them merely to cushion his disagreement with the
authorities.' But this kind of interpretation should be adopted only as a last
resort, if there is no straight-forward interpretation which fits the text.
Especially this is true of Kant, who placed such a high value on sincerity.4
We should not use cushion hermeneutics except as a last resort, if it is the
only possible way to make sense of the text.

II. The 'Constitutive' View of Autonomy
Contemporary secular Kantians have interpreted Kant's views about
autonomy as a form of creative anti-realism. I will interpret him, rather, as
what I will call a 'transcendent realist', namely someone who believes that
there is something beyond the limitations of our understanding. s In particular there is a God who is head of the kingdom of which we are merely
members. When we recognize something as our duty we are in some way
recapitulating the will of this head of the kingdom just as when we believe
something true about the world we are in some way recapitulating the
way things are in themselves. This is a traditional picture of Kant as an
empirical realist, a transcendental idealist, and a transcendent realist. But
interpreting Kant's view of autonomy as a form of creative anti-realism has
been typical of Rawlsians such as Christine Korsgaard and J.B.
Schneewind, and this interpretation has become very influentia1. 6
Christine Korsgaard takes the view that our reflective endorsement of a
prescription makes that prescription normative; it is the source of obliga-
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tion, or even of all value.' Thus if a Mafioso can endorse reflectively the
judgement that he should go out and kill, then he sholiid. If human beings
decided that human life was worthless, then it would be worthless. She
says, 'The point is just this: if one holds the view, as I do, that obligations
exist in the first-person perspective, then in one sense the obligatory is like
the visible: it depends on how much of the light of reflection is on.' I hasten
to add that Korsgaard goes on to say that the Mafioso has a deeper obligation to give up his immoral role. But she feels that she has to concede initially that the Mafioso has the obligation to do the hideous thing, because
of her position that 'it is the endorsement that does the work' (that is, the
normative work).
J.B. Schneewind's magisterial history of modern ethics leading up to
Kant lays out, in Kant's name, what Schneewind calls a 'constitutive'
method of ethics. Here is a statement of this view from an earlier article,
'Reflecting on one's motives one finds oneself giving them a unique kind of
approval or disapproval; in any particular situation one is to act from the
approved motive or set of motives, and the act so motivated is the appropriate action. There is no other source of rightness or wrongness in
actions.'s Schneewind thinks this endorsement is the SOllrce of tile rightness
of the action. That is what makes his method 'constitutive', or a kind of
constructivism or creative anti-realism. Schneewind goes on to use the language of creation, saying that our possession of a constitutive method of
ethics 'shows that we create the moral order in which we live, and supply
our own motives for compliance.,q The view is that if any other will, or
anything external to us, or even our own non-rational appetites are the
source of the normativity, then we are not free but slaves.
1 have doubts about this kind of creative anti-realism in ethics, both in
itself and as an interpretation of Kant. The best place to see why it does not
fit Kant is those passages where Kant, throughout his writings, describes
God as the head of the kingdom of which we are mere members, and
where he says we should recognize our duties as God's commands to us.
In these passages Kant denies that God is the author or creator of the moral
demand, because Kant thinks this demand does not have an author at all.
But if it does not have an author, then we cannot be either its author or its
creator. One passage is from the report of his lectures on ethics from 177580, 'No one, not even God, can be the author of the laws of morality, since
they have no origin in will, but instead a practical necessity. But the moral
laws can nevertheless be subject to a lawgiver (unter einem Gesetzgeber stehen). There can exist a being which has the power and authority to execute
these laws, to declare that they are in accordance with his will, and to
impose upon every one the obligation of acting in accordance with them.
This being is therefore the lawgiver, though not the author of the laws.'l0
Kant revises this position in the Groundwork (1785), but what looks
like a radical revision is not. He says, it is true, that we are authors of
the law. But this is because he has made a distinction not present in the
earlier discussion between two kinds of author. There is the author of
the law and there is the author of the obligation in accordance with the
law. Put carefully, it turns out that God and we can be seen as jointly
authors in the one sense, namely authors of the obligation of the law,
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and neither God nor we can be seen as authors in the other sense, namely authors of the law directly.ll T think this is Kant's view at the time of
the Groundwork and throughout his ethical writing thereafter. Moreover,
saying that God and we are jointly authors of the obligation of the law
does not mean that we are on an equal footing with God as authors in
this sense. It does not mean that our contributions are symmetrical.
Even in the Groundwork Kant makes this clear. He distinguishes
between the king of the kingdom of ends and the rest of the membership
of this kingdom, 'A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a
member, when, although he makes its universal laws, he is also himself
subject to these laws. He belongs to it as its head, when as the maker of
laws he is himself subject to the will of no other'Y Kant goes on to say
that a rational being can maintain the position of head of the kingdom
only if he is a completely independent being, without needs and with an
unlimited power adequate to his will. There is no doubt that Kant is
talking about God here, as head or king of the kingdom, and without a
king there cannot be a kingdom. There is the following asymmetry
between the king and his subjects: We ordinary moral agents have to see
our role as recapitulating in our own wills the declaration in God's will
of our duties. This is how we are lawgivers; we declare a correspondence of our wills with the law (which we do not create). For me to will
the law autonomously is to make it my law. Kant has similar language
in the Second Critique about willing that there is a God, which sounds at
first hearing like blasphemy. But Kant means that we make God our
God. He does not mean 'create' in either case, either that we create the
law or that we create God. Neither God nor the law can do the job Kant
needs them to do if we do create them. Autonomy on this reading is
more nearly a kind of submission than a kind of creation. In what follows, I will use autonomy with this understanding, though I do not
want to deny that the term has been used by others, especially by followers and interpreters of Kant, in a creative anti-realist way.14
The constructivist account of Kant has fallen into the trap of a false
dichotomy. It is easy, but a mistake, to assume that if values are not entirely independent of or external to the will, they must be entirely dependent
on it or internal to it. One way to think of this false dichotomy is to suppose that if values are not like armadillos, things we discover in the world
outside us, they must be like armchairs, things we put into the world or
create, our artefacts. What lies behind the appeal of this dichotomy is what
John Austin called 'the descriptive fallacy'f appealing to Kant as the
philosopher who first uncovered it. IS One way to be guilty of the descriptivist fallacy is to assume that to know the meaning of a normative word
like 'good' is just like knowing the meaning of 'red', namely to know what
things we mayor may not apply it to. In But the assumption is a mistake, the
mistake of thinking that language always works in the same kind of way.
This is the mistake of those who think they have to move from a rejection
of substantive moral realism, where the normativity is entirely external to
the will, to a creati'11c anti-realism, where the normativity is created by the
will. I am encouraged here by Karl Ameriks's response to Schneewind,
rejecting what he calls 'the false trichotomy: either imposed by us, or
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imposed by another, or simply "perceived" as a natural feature'.!7 Kant's
theory is, I believe, an example of a theory which resists such a dichotomy
or trichotomy.
III. Christian August Crusius

An important figure for us to consider here is Christian August
Crusius." Kant needs to be understood against the background of the discussion of divine command theory in the pietist circles he was familiar
with. Schneewind's history of modern ethics, together with his earlier articles, gives Crusius a key place in the development that led to Kant's views
on autonomy. Crusius' views were influential in Konigsberg at the time
Kant was writing, and provided a pietist alternative within philosophy to
the rationalist doctrine of Christian Wolff. Kant's teacher, Martin Knutzen,
undertook the project of reconciling the two. Crusius is presented by
Schneewind as making two central points against Wolff's moral philosophy. First, he introduced what Schneewind calls 'a quite novel distinction'
between two kinds of things we ought to do; there are actions that we
ought to do as means to some end of ours and others we ought to do regardless of any ends we have, even the end of our own perfection. It is only this
second kind of obligation that Crusius is willing to call 'moral obligation'.
Here, says Schneewind, is the origin of Kant's notion of the categorical
imperative. Second, Crusius tied this distinction to the notion of freedom.
He said that the will is free only because it can choose in accordance with
this second kind of obligation. That is to say that even if we perceive
something clearly as required for an increase in perfection, we can choose
either for it or against it. This is contrary to Wolff because Wolff taught
that by nature the availability of increased perfection necessarily moves us,
and we are always obligated to pursue it. We are always drawn to act so
as to bring about what we believe is the greatest amount of perfection, and
Wolff savs we are bound or necessitated so to act.!O
Now "it may seem churlish to say of a 600 page history that it has not
given us enough of the historical context, but I think in this case it is true.
Schneewind is wrong to say that it is 'a quite novel distinction' to distinguish being drawn to some end of ours as ours and being drawn regardless
of any ends we have, even the end of our own perfection. Both this distinction and the distinctive tying of this distinction to freedom come from
Duns Scotus, and before Scotus from Anselm. Duns Scotus holds that
there are two affections of the will, the affection for advantage, directed to
one's own happiness or perfection, and the affection for justice, which is
directed to what is good in itself regardless of one's ends. For Scotus we
are only free because we have the affection for justice. This distinction
between the affections is to be found in both Lutheran and Reformed theology.20 Scotism was a widely accessible option in the intellectual milieu in
which the Reformers lived. Luther makes the point repeatedly that one
who does the good in order to promote his own blessedness is still not
devoted to the good itself; rather, he is using it as a means for 'climbing up
to the Divine majesty' .21 Perhaps Crus ius came to the distinction by reflecting on Luther.
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In Scotus and in the Reformers and in Crusius, this distinction is tied
into a version of divine command theory. Scotus thinks that God necessarily loves God, and then wills to have co-lovers (though God does not will
this necessarily). Moreover God necessarily orders these creatures towards
union with God, their primary good. From this come the first group of the
ten commandments. But the route to this end is not necessary, and is within God's prescriptive discretion. Here we have the second group of the ten
commandments specifying our duty to the neighbour, and these are binding upon us because God has chosen them; though they are not arbitrary,
because they lead to our final end. Now Schneewind, like Socrates in the
Ellthyphro, presents us with a choice: 'whether morally right acts are right
simply because God commands us to do them, or whether, by contrast,
God commands us to do them because they are, in themselves, right'.22 But
the Scotist form of divine command theory does not fit this dichotomy.
Our duties to the neighbour are right both because God chooses that route
and because it is a route to our final good. In Crusius there is the same
kind of structure as in Scotus. God has an essential tendency to self-affirmation and when God creates us (which is not necessary) God must desire
that our strivings should be directed in accordance with our highest objective end, which is union with God. But this means, Crusius says, that our
highest formal end is compliance with God's will and command.21
Crusius does not merely recapitulate Scotus, however; he adds to him. I
want to emphasize one such addition, and I want to claim that this addition is the focus of Kant's famous objection in the Groundwork to the theological version of heteronomy. The addition is most clearly seen in the
way Crusius divides up the basic human desires. Scotus was concerned to
deny eudaimonism, the view that all our motivation is directed towards
happiness. He therefore divided up the affection for advantage and the
affection for justice. Crusius is likewise opposed to eudaimonism. But for
him there are not two but three basic categories of desire. The first is the
drive to increase our own appropriate perfection, and from this come the
desires for truth, darity, good reasoning, the arts, bodily improvement,
freedom, friendship, and honour. Second comes the disinterested or impartial drive for perfection, and from this comes a general desire to help others. But third, and distinct and incommensurable with these first two, is
what Crusius calls 'the drive of conscience' which is 'the natural drive to
recognize a divine moral law'. His idea is that we have within us this separate capacity to recognize divine command and to be drawn towards it out
of a sense of dependence on the God who prescribes the command to us,
and will punish us if we disobey (GRL 132). It is a good thing, Crusius
thinks, that we do have this drive of conscience. For there is no way that
most of us could most of the time reason out what we ought to do. God
therefore gives us a 'shorter path' to knowledge of the divine law, and this
makes God's will evident in such a way that it can come to everyone's
knowledge (GRL 135). In this way, no-one is excused from accountability.
What Crusius is doing is to propose a capacity humans have for receiving divine command as such, and he separates this from the mere disinterested desire for perfection (or what Scotus would call the affection for justice). He is giving a particular reading of Romans I and II in which the law
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is written 'on our hearts' and even those who 'suppress the truth' are
'without excuse'. This drive of conscience is supposed to be a sense which
humans quite generally have of being dependent on some higher being
and therefore of having obligation to do what that higher being tells them
to do. But recognizing the commands of this being and being moved to
obey is supposed to be a different drive from recognizing intrinsic good
and being moved to pursue it.
Schneewind puts the distinction between Kant and Crusius this way.
He thinks Kant is trying to show how we as moral agents can be independent of divine legislation, and how morality can be a human creation.
Schneewind takes Crus ius, on the other hand, to be arguing that we are
dependent on God. Here is Schneewind's dichotomy: Either there is independcllce of morality from God or there is a Crusian depl'1ldence. I am going
to suggest that Kant's actual view is neither of these, and that we should
follow Kant in this respect.
IV. Kant's Argument about Dilline Commands in the Groundwork
What I want to do next is to return to the brief (and famous) argument
in the Groundwork which is often taken to be an argument against divine
command theory. Since Kant's argument is brief, I will quote it in full.
Kant rejects 'the theological concept which derives morality from a divine
and supremely perfect will; not merely because we cannot intuit God's
perfection and can only derive it from our own concepts, among which
that of morality is the most eminent; but because, if we do not do this (and
to do so would be to give a crudely circular explanation), the concept of
God's will still remaining to us -one drawn from such characteristics as lust
for glory and domination and bound up with frightful ideas of power and
vengefulness- would inevitably form the basis for a moral system which
would be in direct opposition to morality.'2!
This argument has been taken, together with a brief and impenetrable
passage in Plato's Euthyphro, as a decisive rejection of the whole idea of
divine command theory." But I think the argument sounds quite different,
and is a better argument, if we construe it as an attack, not on divine command theory in general, but on Crusius's particular form of it. I think the
heart of Kant's objection is to the separation of the 'drive of conscience' as a
separate capacity,z"
The typical reading of this argument in twentieth century analytic philosophy takes it as a refutation of the divine command theory of ethical
obligation in general. Here, to give just one example, is R. M. Hare's verdict, 'Ever since Kant, it has been possible for people to insist on the autonomy of morals - its independence of human or divine authority. Indeed, it
has been necessary, if they were to think morally, in the sense in which that
word is now generally understood.'27 The claim here is that Kant has made
it possible for us to think of morality as independent of divine or human
authority, and that we now have to think of it that way if we want to use
the moral words in the way most people understand them. 28 R. M. Hare
talks also of a 'God, whom Kant would have liked to believe in."g Similarly
Lewis White Beck takes Kant to be arguing that moral duties do not owe
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their authority in any way to being divine commands. After conceding
that Kant talks as if he were a divine command theorist (in this sense), Beck
says on Kant's behalf, 'It is not that (duties) are divine commands, or that
they owe their authority over us to their being decrees of a divine lawgiver
who also created us; for in that event, we should have to know about God
before we could know what our dutv is, and we do not know God, while
even the most unphilosophical person knows his duty. Moreover, such a
theory would be incompatible with moral self-government, or autonomy.""
So Beck interprets Kant as saying that we should regard the moral law as if
it were a divine command, and the people under this law as if it were 'a
people united by common allegiance to a supposed author of these commands, namely God'. But the 'as if' in these contexts is stressed in such a
way as to de~y that we should believe in the actual existence of such
divine commands or their legislator. God's existence is not, however, for
Kant, 'as if'.31 Kant is not an agnostic, except that he does not 'know' in his
own very restricted sense of 'knowing', according to which we can only
know what we could possibly experience with the senses or what is apodictically certain. We do not in this sense know that God exists. But Kant
holds that we are required to believe that God exists. In just the same sense,
he holds that we are required to believe that God is (with us) the legislator
of moral law, and (unlike us) the rewarder and punisher of our lives as a
whole in relation to this law. We have to deny knowledge in order to
make room for faith.12
If, like most contemporary exegetes, one reads Kant's argument as an
attack on divine command theory in general, it will naturally be construed
as presenting the following two-horned dilemma. We have two choices
on the divine command theory: Either we derive the notion of God's perfection from our moral concepts or we do not. If we do (the first horn),
then the derivation which the divine command theory proposes is crudely
circular. It says we have moral obligations because God commands them,
and we should obey God's commands because they are morally right. But
if we separate (on the second horn) our notion of God's will from the moral
concepts, then the explanation of our obligation will depend merely on our
ability to please God and God's ability (if we do not) to hurt us. The relationship between us, when stripped of right, will reduce to one of power.
But then morality will be based on self-interest, and will not be what (on
Kant's view) morality in fact is. So neither choice is available to us, and so
the divine command theory should be rejected. J3
This is an important argument, and I will come back to it at the end. But
it cannot be, if Kant is consistent, Kant's argument. For Kant accepts the
view throughout his life that we should recognize our duties as God's
commands. For example, there is the passage in Lectures on Ethics, 'Our
bearing towards God must be characterized by reverence, love and fear reverence for Him as a holy lawgiver, love for His beneficent rule, and fear
of Him as a just judge' (which is different, Kant says, from merely being
afraid of God when we have transgressed). 'We show our reverence by
regarding His law as holy and righteous, by due respect for it, and by seeking to fulfil it in our disposition.'34 I have already mentioned the passage in
the Groundwork about God as the head of the kingdom of ends, and there
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are passages in the Second Critique and Religion within the Limits of Reason
Alone about recognizing our duties as God's commands." Because this is a
sustained theme in Kant, we are better off regarding his attack in the
Groundwork as directed at some more specific target. The theory of Crusius
is an excellent candidate.
Kant objects to Crusius's theory on three grounds. He starts the argument by saying that we cannot intuit God's perfection. This starting point
makes sense if it is Crus ius he has in mind. Crusius had proposed that we
have a separate access to divine perfection through 'the drive of conscience', separate from the general moral love or the disinterested drive for
perfection (GRL 132). Kant's position is, rather, that we cannot intuit
God's perfection, because human intuition is limited within space and
time. This is his first objection. Our access is, therefore, through concepts.
Either these will be the moral concepts, or some other. This presents a
Crusius-type divine command theory with a dilemma.
Suppose we take the first option, and reply that we can know what God
wills, since he wills what the moral law prescribes. Here is the second
objection. This would be, Kant says, crudely circular. He may be objecting
to just such a crude circle in the passage from Crusius I quoted earlier,
'Finally, the third of the basic human drives is the natural drive to recognize a divine moral law' (GRL 132, emphasis added).'b Crusius adds in the
word 'moral' at a key point in his definition without showing how he can
simultaneously insist on the separation of the three basic drives. 37 It is a
crude circle to prove that A is B by adding B to the definition of A. What is
needed is a 'third term' C, which can be connected first with A and then
with B." In Kant's own account the third term is provided by our membership with God in the kingdom of ends. But Crusius just gives us the crude
circle without such mediation.
Finally, there is a third point Kant makes against Crusius. If we think
we can understand what God is telling us to do without using the moral
concepts, we will be left without morality at all. Kant must have in mind
as his target a form of the divine command theory which forbids us to justify obedience on the grounds that God cares for the well-being of the
whole creation. In other words, we are forbidden by this form of the theory to appeal to God's practical love. A Crusius-type divine command theory insists that we should obey God's will just because it is God's will, whatever our direct intuition tells us that will is. 39 This makes a nonsense of
morality. The point of morality is to further one's own perfection and the
happiness of others:" The kingdom of ends is the place where these two
goals coincide. A morality which ignored one's own perfection and the
happiness of others would be unintelligible. But this is just the kind of
morality Crus ius seems to be asking us to adopt as our own. It is not that
Crusius is here making the gross claim that what should move us to obedience is hope of reward or fear of punishment. Indeed, I started from his
insistence, which he holds in common with Scotus, that we have sources of
motivation other than our happiness or perfection. It is notable that Kant
also, in his reply, does not say that his opponent bases morality on hope of
reward or fear of punishment, but rather 'that the concept of God's will
remaining to us will be drawn from such characteristics as lust for glory
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and domination and bound up with frightful ideas of power and vengefulness'. What Kant is interested in is what our idea of God will be like if we
separate out the drive of conscience from the distinterested desire to help
other people, as Crusius suggests. And we find that Crus ius does emphasize that it is a God who will punish us if we do not obey, even though this
is not to be our motivation for obedience."' It would have been easy for
Kant, if he were making a general attack on divine command theory, to
make the point about not basing morality on fear or hope of reward, and I
suspect that is the way his argument is in fact usually taught. I used to
teach it that way myself. But it is not what Kant says. So all three steps of
the argument are specifically tailored to attack Crusius.
Is Kant taking us back in this argument to a pre-Crusian Scotist form of
divine command theory? In some ways, yes. Kant shares with Scotus the
view that there are the two basic affections of the will, and that we start
with the wrongful ranking of them. He shares the view that our freedom
is tied to the good will. Two major differences are that in Kant there is no
distinction in terms of necessity and contingency between the first and second tables of the law. And he describes our final end not as being colovers with God, but as a perfect combination of virtue and happiness. But
there are two similarities I want to stress. In both Scotus and Kant, we
share our final end with God, in the sense that both we and God aim at our
own perfection. And in both Scotus and Kant God's willing is constrained
by necessity, despite the Scotist emphasis on God's choosing the second
table. I will return to these points at the end. 42

v. Autonomolls Relations to Political Authority
We can see that Kant is not making submission incompatible with
autonomy if we compare what he says our relation is to political authority.
Autonomy is being both legislator and subject to the law. One source of
this idea is the tradition from Aristotle and the scholastics of seeing the
good citizen as possessing 'the knowledge and capacity requisite both for
ruling and for being ruled. The excellence of a citizen may be defined as
consisting in a practical knowledge of the governance of free men from
both points of view' .13 Kant believes that the autonomy of a good citizen is
not only consistent with submission to political authority, but requires this
submission. He argues that coercion by the state is necessary in order to
prevent coercion by individuals, which would be an obstacle to the external exercise of autonomy. External compulsion by the state is thus 'a hindering of the hindrances to freedom':4 To quote Mary Gregor's introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, 'It is only within a civil condition, where
there is a legislator to enact laws, an executive to enforce them, and a judiciary to settle disputes about rights by reference to such public laws, that
human beings can do what it can be known a priori they must be able to
do in accordance with moral principles'.'5 The justification of the state then
rests for Kant on moral grounds, on the freedom of each individual person
and our obligation to respect this in each other. A citizen is in this way
morally justified in adopting into her own will the will of her ruler. The
analogy with God's rule is systematic. Kant gives God executive and judi-
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cial as well as legislative functions within the kingdom, and God has to
exercise those functions in order for the subjects in this kingdom 'to do
what it can be known a priori they must be able to do in accordance with
moral principles.' The analogy in fact goes beyond this, though I will not
spell this out. Just as in God's kingdom, so in an earthly kingdom there are
three kinds of mistake a citizen might make in claiming justification for her
obedience. They are the same three kinds of mistake Crusius makes in
analysing our relation to God. The point I want to make here, though, is
that Kant cannot mean to construct an argument from autonomy against
all forms of external authority. The opposite is true. He thinks that autonomy requires submission to at least one kind of external authority, namely
the authority of the state.
The analogy with political authority is helpful in understanding the role
of sanctions in our relation to God. As we have already seen, this is not
supposed to be the ground of our obedience. But it is essentially tied to the
way in which God can be the author of the obligation to obey the law in a
way that we are not. Christine Korsgaard says, 'Why then are sanctions
needed? The answer is that they are necessary to establish the authority of
the legislator ... .The legislator is necessary to make obligation possible, that
is, to make morality normative.''" She gives the example of a student who
takes a logic course because it is required by his department. It might seem
that he acts more autonomously if he takes it because he independently
sees its merit. But he acts autonomously out of his practical identity as a
student only if he places the right to make and enforce some of the decisions about what he will study in the hands of his teachers. Similarly, a
good citizen as a citizell does not pay her taxes because she thinks the government needs the money. She can vote for taxes for that reason. But once
the vote is over, she must pay her taxes because it is the law. To extend
this analysis to the context of divine command theory, we could say that an
agent acts autonomously out of her practical identity as a citizen of God's
kingdom only if she acts out of obedience to God. In none of these three
cases (the student, the citizen of an earthly kingdom and the citizen of
God's kingdom) is there any inconsistency with the agent sharing the ends
of her superior. But in all three cases there is a true duty 'which must be
represented as at the same time that (superior's) command.' (Rei. VI, 99).
The role of the sanctions is to make the kingdom possible, and the ground
of obedience is not fear of the sanctions but membership in the kingdom.
It is worth spelling out why the kingdom of ends has to be a kingdom
and not, for example, a republic. Kant's view is that the only earthly constitution that accords with right is that of a pure republic.'7 The difference
between republic and kingdom matters to him. It is therefore misleading
to gloss the kingdom of ends as 'the republic of all rational beings', and to
call a friendship 'a kingdom of two'." Between friends there is no king. J. L.
Mackie is more accurate here. He says, 'But for the need to give God a special place in it, (the kingdom of ends) would have been better called a commonwealth of ends."~ In Kant's theory God has combined in one person
the legislative, executive and judicial functions which Kant thinks should
be separated in a well-run earthly republic. In brief, 'We must conceive a
Supreme Being whose laws are holy, whose government is benev(~~:::-L~ and
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whose rewards and punishments are juSt.""
The legislative function we have already met. But there is a key difference from the legislation of an earthly state. Ethical legislation concerns the
heart, and not merely the behaviour of the citizenry. Kant accordingly says
that the ruler of the ethical realm 'must be one who knows the heart, in
order to penetrate to the most intimate parts of the disposition of each and
everyone and, as must be in every community, give to each according to the
worth of his actions.' God's promulgating the moral law to the heart is what
Kant describes in the preface to the second edition of Religion as the revelation to reason. There is an additional point here. God, as legislator, will not
ask us to do what is impossible for us, though God may ask us to do what is
impossible for us on our own. The point is that God offers us the so-tospeak executive assistance to do what God as legislator calls us to do.
God's executive function can be divided into various parts. One part is
the execution of the rewards and punishments which God declares in the
judicial function. There is also, however, the 'maintenance' of the law
(Lectures p. 81). We have to believe that a system is in place and is being
maintained in which the ends of the other members of the kingdom are
consistent with each other and with ours. This is what we might call a coordination problem. The world might be the kind of place in which I can
only be happy if other people are not, or in which some of the people I
affect by my actions can only be happy if other people I affect are not. Kant
says that Tam, as a creature of need, bound to desire my own happiness in
everything else I desire, (though my happiness is not the only source of my
motivation).51 And r am required to pursue the happiness of others as
much as my own, since we ought to share each other's ends as far as the
moral law al10wsY But we can only do all this if there is a system in place
in which others' ends are first consistent with each other and, second, consistent with our own happiness. Since we do not know the contents either
of our own happiness or that of others, we cannot see by inspection
whether these consistencies obtain. 54 We need to presuppose, Kant says,
the idea of a higher moral being/through whose universal organization the
forces of single individuals, insufficient on their own, are united for a common effect.' (Rei. VI, 98) The common effect Kant has in mind here is the
highest good, in which all are virtuous and all are happy. This is his translation of the psalmist's idea of righteousness and peace embracing each
other (Psalm 85: 10). Kant's point is that we have to believe in God's executive functions in order to have the faith that such a good is possible. In fact,
with this belief we can have not merely moral faith but moral hope,
because God as Lord of history is bringing the kingdom to fruition.
Finally, there is the judicial function. This is already implicit in what I
have said. We have to suppose that God can see our hearts and can justly
separate the sheep and the goats. It is not merely that God applies justly
the standards, but that the standards God applies are just. Twill sum up by
quoting from the Second Critique, in which Kant stresses that moral rightness is an end common to us and to God, but that God's role is different
and non-symmetrical with ours and is nonetheless essential to our moral
life. 'Religion', Kant says, 'is the recognition of all duties as divine commands, Dct as sanctions, i.e. arbitrary and contingent ordinances of a for-
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eign will, but as essential laws of any free will as such. Even as such, they
must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being, because we can
hope for the highest good (to strive for which is our duty under moral law)
only from a morally perfect (holy and beneficent) and omnipotent will;
and, therefore, we can hope to attain it only through harmony with this
will' (KpV V, 130, emphasis added).
VI. Conclusion

I have tried to show that Kant does not intend a general argument
against divine command theory. I want to end by showing that the general
argument usually but wrongly read into the Groundwork does not work. We
can see this if we hold onto Kant's and Scotus's view that we and God are
jointly but non-symmetrically engaged in our moral life, and that we share
our final end with God. Autonomous submission, I want to say, is recapitulating in our wills what God has willed for our willing. This kind of mutuality is present in the idea of a covenant, because a covenant is between people who share commitment to the kind of life the covenant sets up as normative. This allows us to endorse a divine command theory which is what
Robert Adams calls 'theonomous'.'6 He says, 'Let us say that a person is
theonomous to the extent that the following is true of him: He regards his
moral principles as given him by God, and adheres to them partly out of
love or loyalty to God, but he also prizes them for their own sakes, so that
they are the principles he would give himself if he were giving himself a
moral law. The theonomous agent, in so far as he is right, acts morally
because he loves God, but also because he loves what God loves.'"
I want to connect this idea of theonomy with the Scotist distinction
between our final end of union with God and our route to that end. It
needs a different paper to describe and evaluate the details of Scotus's
account. But the key idea is that the second table of the law, the specification of our duties to the neighbour, is binding on us because God has
selected it. Contrary to some versions of natural law theory, this part of the
law is not deducible from our human nature. God could have chosen a
different route for beings with our nature to reach our final end. I am not
attributing this view to Kant. But I am suggesting that if Scotus is right
about this, then autonomy can be reconciled with a version of divine command theory. If we try to mount the argument from autonomy that is usually (but wrongly) associated with Kant, we will fail. This is because there
is nothing heteronomous about willing to obey a superior's prescription
because the superior has prescribed it, as long as the final end is shared
between us. The dichotomy which the usual version of the argument relies
upon is false. The dichotomy is the one I mentioned before in connection
with Schneewind's view of Kant: Kanhan independence or Crusian dependence; either our own wills entirely or entirely the will of another. What
human moral life is actually like on the Scotist picture is a complex and
rich mixture.
The notion of recapitulating God's will in ours is, however, vague in
various ways. There is a range of cases here. Willing is always under a
description, and the descriptions under which two people share an end
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may vary.58 Take the following example, which lowe to Robert C.
Roberts. A teenager's mother wills that her son not sleep with his girlfriend, and in willing this she wills that her son live a fully chaste life by
Christian standards for the spiritual union properly surrounding sexual
intercourse. Suppose her son does not share her Christian understanding.
There is a range of possible ways in which the son might nonetheless
repeat his mother's will. Perhaps he does not want to lose his inheritance.
This would be crude form of heteronomy. Perhaps he respects his mother,
though not her view. He does not want to hurt her, and he is grateful to
her. This is neither heteronomy nor autonomous submission, but somewhere in between. Or perhaps he does accept the Christian teaching about
sexuality, but barely understands it. He abstains because he wants to be a
good Christian, but the proscription makes no sense to him. Here the
mother and the son may even share a description under which something
is willed, but it is not equally resonant for the two. Finally the son may
share his mother's understanding as well as her prescription. But on
Christian doctrine this kind of shared understanding is one we can never
have completely with Cod, even in heaven. It is possible, then, to share
ends with another person, or with Cod, with many different degrees of
clarity and fullness.
Suppose the son shares an end with his mother, but does not understand it very well, certainly less well than she does. Is his response
autonomous or heteronomous? For Schneewind, the answer is a matter of
degree, as in the story I have just told, but will tend towards heteronomy.
He constructs a picture of what he calls 'the Divine Corporation'.'9 He
imagines a large corporation, the sort of corporation in which Dilbert is
employed. The ordinary employees understand very little about each
other's jobs or the purposes of the whole corporation, there is a strong
back-up system so that failures by others will be rem.edied and ordinary
employees do not have to feel responsible for the remedy themselves, and
the supervisor has made it clear that they are paid for carrying out their
duties strictly, 'looking neither to left nor to right'. This, he says, is the traditional Christian picture of the kingdom of Cod, with Cod as the head of
the firm. Schneewind thinks progress towards autonomy occurs in the history of ethics as each of these three conditions weakens. First, we come to
see the purpose of the 'corporation' as promoting human happiness.
Second we see ourselves as the major instruments in producing this end or
failing to produce it. Third we see ourselves as cooperating with each
other in producing this end, and as responsible for repairing each other's
omissions. In swnmary, 'As Cod's supervision and activity lessen, man's
responsibility increases.' I do not want to deny that this movement of
thought has occurred within academic philosophy in the last two hundred
years. But as far as I can see, there is no way to determine whether this
movement is progress towards a desirable kind of autonomy without settling first whether there is a Cod who has created us and rules the world
providentially in the way the traditional picture and Kant himself suggest.
If there is, and we decline to relate ourselves to God as God's subjects, this
is not a desirable form of autonomy but it is like the graduate student in
Korsgaard's example refusing on the grounds of autonomy to take the
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required courses for the degree. My main point has been that this is not
Kant's notion of autonomy; and that if we want to say it is nonetheless a
desirable notion of autonomy, we will have to do some prior dismantling
of traditional theism.

Calvin College
NOTES
1.

Allen Wood denies that Kant is a pure rationalist, ('Kant's Deism', in

Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, op. cit. 11.) For arguments against
Wood, see John Hare, The Moml Cap, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996,42-45.
2. Religion VI, 13. I will be making references to Kant by using the page
numbers of the relevant volume of the Academy edition.
3. Allen Wood, 'Kant's Deism', in Kallt's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered,
ed. Philip). Rossi and Michael Wreen, Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1991,1-21,14. See also the phrase in E. Troeltsch, 'utterances of prudence',
quoted in Michel Despland, Kant on History and Religion, Montreal: McGillQueen's University Press, 1973, lOS, and the phrase 'cover' techniques in
Yirmiahu Yovet Kant and the Philosophy of History, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1980, 114 and 215. Another similar strategy is to appeal to
clumsy editing.
4. e.g. Conflict of the Facuities VII, 10, and KrV III and TV, A748-50=B776-S.
5. See Heinz Heimsoeth, 'Metaphysical Motives in the Development of
Critical Idealism', in Kant: Disputed Questions, ed. M. S. Gram, Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1967. I have been influenced by a paper by Robert M.
Adams, 'Things in Themselves', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57
(Dec. 1997),801-25.
6. I am going to mention Christine Korsgaard again at the end; but for an
extended review, see Faith and Philosophy, volume 17, 3, (July 2000) 371-83.
7. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of NormatizJity, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996, 91; and Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996,240-1.
S. J. B. Schneewind, 'Natural Law, Skepticism, and the Methods of Ethics',
Journal of the History of ideas, 52 (1991) 298. Curiously, the actual treatment of
Kant at the end of The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998) is brief, almost perfunctory. Schneewind hilS, however,
given a fuller treatment of Kant's views on autonomy in a succession of articles, and I have made use especially of 'The Divine Corporation ilnd the
History of Ethics', in Philosophy and History, ed. Richard Rorty,]. B. Schneewind
and Quentin Skinnner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 173-92,
'Natural Law, Skepticism, and Methods of Ethics' op. cit., and 'Autonomy,
Obligiltion and Virtue: An Overview of Kant's Ethics', in The Cambridge
Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992, 309-41.
9. Ibid. 302, emphasis added. In The Invention of Autonomy, Schneewind
does not emphasize the language of creation, but he does say that Kant agrees
with his predecessors who hold that moral approval is 'like the Pufendorfian
divine will that creates moral entities', so that 'our approval is what makes
some motives good, others bad/, op. cit. 524.
10. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, p. 51-2.
11. Kant says that practical reason (the will) should be allowed to 'simply

474

Faith and Philosophy

manifest its own sovereign authority as the supreme maker of law', and earlier
he glosses this notion of the will making the law in terms of the will being its
author, Gl IV, 441 and 431. Patrick Kain has traced with great elegance the
emergence of the new way of making the distinction, in the fifth chapter of his
dissertation from the University of Notre Dame (1999). For example, in the
fragment of lecture notes referred to as 'Moral Mrongovius II', Kant is reported
to have said to his students in 1785 (while he was writing the Groundwork),
'The lawgiver is not the author of the law, rather he is the author of the obligation of the law (Autor del' obligation des Gezetzes)', XXIX 633-4. The new way of
stating the distinction becomes standard for him, as in the following passage
from the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), 'A (morally practical) law is a proposition
that contains a categorical imperative (a command). One who commands
(imperans) through a law is the lawgiver (legislator). He is the author (autor, sic)
of the obligation in accordance with the law (Urheber (autor) der Verbilldlichkeit
nach dem Gesetz), but not always the author of the law. In the latter case the law
would be a positive (contingent) and chosen law. A law that binds us a priori
and unconditionally by our own reason can also be expressed as proceeding
from the will of a supreme lawgiver, that is, one who has only rights and no
duties (hence from the divine will); but this signifies only the Idea of a moral
being whose will is a law for everyone, without his being thought as the author
of the law.' Here we have essentially the same distinction between lawgiver
and author, but now expressed in terms of two kinds of authorship (MM VI,
227).
12. GllV,433-4.
13. KpVV, 143.
14. See Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, (London: SCM Press, 1980, 9), 'A
modern person must not any more surrender the apex of his self-consciousness
to a god. It must remain his own.'
15. John Austin, How to do Things with Words, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1965,3.
16. See R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981,67.
17. Karl Ameriks, 'On Schneewind and Kant's Method in Ethics', Ideas y
Valores, no. 102 Dec. 1996,48.
18. Paton already remarked on this importance, see Immanuel Kant,
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. and analysed by H. J. Paton,
Harper, New York: 1964, p.141. For Crusius's views, see the selection from
'Guide to Rational Living', in Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, vol II, ed.
J. B. Schneewind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 568-585
(henceforth GRL). See also Giorgio Tonelli, 'La Question des bornes de l'entendement humain au XVIIIe siecle', Revue de metaphysique et de morale (1959), 396427. In the Second Critique (KpV V, 40), Kant mentions Crusius as the source
of the view which locates the practical material determining ground of morality externally in the will of God. See also Momlphilosophie Col/ins, KGS 262-3,
'Crusius believes that all obligation is related to the will of another (die Willkiir

cines andernY.

19. J. B. Schneewind, 'Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue', op. cit., 312-3.
20. For Luther, the route is through Ockham. The nominalist tradition or
via moderna was adopted by Gregory of Rimini, who was General of the
Hermits of St. Augustine, which was Luther's order a century and a half later.
Gabriel Bid, at Tubingen, wrote an influential exposition of Ockham's system,
which was taught at Erfurt (by two of Luther's professors, Jaadokus Trutfetter
and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi) and at Wittenberg (where Luther did most of his
teaching). See especially Heiko Oberman, Luther: A Man Between God and the
Devil, Eileen Walliser-Schwarzenbart, trans., New York: Doubleday, 1989, 118-

DUTiES AS GOD'S COMMANDS

475

19. For Calvin, the influence through John Major and the College de Montaigu
was stated by Francois Wendel, Calvin, trans. Philip Mairet, New York: Harper
and Row, 1950, and fully worked out by Karl Reuter, in Das Grundverstaendnis
der Theologie Calvins, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener-Verlag, 1963. An
enthusiastic advocate is Thomas Torrance, in The Hermeneutics of John Cal'l'in,
Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1988, and also Alexander Broadie, The
Shadow of Scotus, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995. A more sceptical reading of
the evidence can be found in A. Ganoczy, 'Le jeune Calvin: Genese et evolution
de sa vocation reformatrice', Wiesbaden, 1966, and A. N. S. Lane, 'Calvin's Use
of the Fathers and the Medievals', Calvin Theological jourlll1116 (1981) 149-205.
21. WA 2, 493, 12ff.
22. Schneewind, 'The Divine Corporation and the History of Ethics', op. cit.,
176.
23. GRL 176 and 216.
24. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (henceforth, GI) 443.
25. For a statement of the problem with understanding the passage in the
Euthyphro 10a1-11b5, see John E. Hare, Plato's Euthyphro, Bryn Mawr
Commentaries, 1985,21-25.
26. Crusius also took the extreme position on the authority of Scripture that
no rational criticism of the Bible was permitted, and that its meaning could be
penetrated only by a kind of empathy or inner light. Kant objects to this claim
as well, but not in the same argument.
27. R M. Hare in The Simple Believer', reprinted in Essays on Religion and
Education, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 30. This argument in the Groundwork
has had the same kind of status in Ethics as the treatment of the Ontological
Argument in the First Critique has had in Metaphysics.
28. It is a dubious empirical claim that the usage of most people in the
world divorces morality from divine command. Perhaps this is true of most
professional philosophers? Other examples of the kind of interpretation I am
objecting to are A. C. Ewing, Value and Reality, London: Allen and Unwin, 1973,
183-187, and James Rachels, 'God and Human Attitudes', reprinted in Divine
Conmlands and Morality, ed. Paul Helm, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 34-48,
especially 44f. One vivid example is Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good,
New York: Schocken Books, 1971, 80, 'Kant's man had already nearly a century
earlier received a glorious incarnation in the work of Milton: his proper name
is Lucifer.' The argument itself, without explicit attachment to Kant, is pervasive. One nice statement of it is in P. H. Nowell-Smith's Ethics,
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954, 192-3.
29. Sorting Out Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997,27.
30. Lewis White Beck, Six Secular Philosophers, New York: Harper, 1960, 724. But it is not in general true for Kant that a prescription has authority only if
we know about its source. As I shall argue, Kant thinks that the prescriptions
of a legitimate political ruler have authority and have their source in his will;
but we do not have knowledge about this will.
31. Kant does use the 'as if' locution counterfactually, but to express what
our moral lives would be like without God, 'each must, on the contrary, so conduct himself as if everything depended on him.'(Rel. VI, 101, where the point is
that everything does not depend on the agent). At ReI. VI, 154 Kant makes the
point that no assertoric knowledge is required in religion so far as theoretical
cognition and profession of faith are concerned, since all that is required is a
problematic assumption; but with respect to the object towards which our
morally legislative reason bids us work, what is presupposed is an assertoric
faith. He goes on (it is true) to say that this faith needs only the idea of God. But
this again is an epistemological limitation, not a point about what we should

476

Faith and Philosophy

believe exists.
32. KrVIII (second ed.), xxx.
33. There are problems with the argument on this second horn. What
needs to be attended to is the different ways in which we can separate God's
will from the moral concepts. On God's side we can distinguish the claim that
the divine will is inconsistent with what is morally right from the claim that
this willing, though consistent, does not go through the moral concepts. On
our side we can distinguish the claim that we have to obey even if God's will is
inconsistent with what is morally right from the claim that we must obey even
in cases where we cannot determine whether it is consistent with what is
morally right or not.
34. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1963,
97.
35. KpV V, 130. ReI. VI, 154.
36. See Lewis White Beck, A Commentary 011 Kant's Critique of Practical
Reason, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960, 107, 'Either Crusius surreptitiously introduces ethical predicates into the concept of divine perfection' (and
Beck refers to this passage of Crusius), 'with the result that theological perfection no longer grounds the moral principle but presupposes it; or a hedonistic
motivation is postulated as the ground of obedience to God.' But Kant is not
exactly accusing Crusius of this second error, as I will argue in the following
paragraph.
37. 'It is thus not specially necessary to show that the drive of conscience is
distinct from the previously distinguished basic drives, as its object is so very
different from those of the other drives.' (GRL 134)
38. An instructive comparison is Kant's fear in the third section of
Groundwork that he may have argued in a circle about morality and freedom
(Gl IV, 450). Kant thinks he has extricated himself from the viciousness of this
circle when he later points out that 'when we think of ourselves as free, we
transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members' (GI IV, 453). He gives
us here a third term which mediates between morality and freedom, namely
our membership in the intelligible world.
39. See Robert M. Adams, 'Autonomy and Theological Ethics', in The
Virtlle of Faith, Oxford University Press: 1987, 123-7. Adams approves of
Tillich's notion of theonomous ethics, 'The theonomous agent acts morally
because he loves God, but also because he loves what God loves.' Kant on my
reading, but not Crusius, has a theonomous ethics. I will rehlrn to Adams at
the end of this paper. Crusius himself would not be worried by this objection.
See Tonelli, op.cit. 410 (my translation), 'Crusius underlines the importance of
mysteries of reaSOIl, mainly theological doctrines which have to be admitted,
even though we do not understand how certain things can be joined together
or separated in such a way.'
40. This is to put the point in terms of the matter of morality, rather than its
form (which is more usual in the Groundwork). See the Metaphysics of Morals
VI,398.
41. The motive of conscience', he says, is therefore merely a motive to recognize certain indebtednesses, that is, such universal obligations as one must
observe even if one does not wish to collsider the advantages and disadvantages deriving from them, whose transgression God will punish and, if his law is not to be in
vain, must punish.' (GRL 133, emphasis added).
42. In the Lectures on Ethics (op. cit. 22) Kant distinguishes between positive
(or contingent) obligation and natural obligation, which arises from the nature
of the action itself; and then complains, 'Crusius believes that all obligation is
related to the will of another. So in his view all obligation would be a necessi-

DUTIES AS GOD'S COMMANDS

477

tation per arbitrium altaius. It may indeed seem that in ,111 obligation we are
necessitated per arbitrillm alterill~; but in fact I am necessitated by an arbitrilllll
illternum, not externum, and thus by the necessary condition of universal will.'
What Kant is objecting to here, on my view, is not in itself the appeal to a superior will, but to making this will merely external, or separate from the universal
will. In Kant's own way of recognizing our duties as God's commands, this
can be and should be consistent with seeing them as permitted by the moral
law, and thus the universal will. To put this more simply, what Kant wants in
our autonomous submission is both our will and God's together, neither of
them being sufficient without the other.
43. Aristotle Politics III, 2, 1277b14-16.
44. MM VI. 396. See also MM VI, 231, '(Whatever) counteracts the hindrance of an effect promotes that effect and is consistent with it.'
45. Mary Gregor, translator's introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 10.
46. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of N0r17111tivity, 01'. cit., 25f and 105-7.
She goes on to argue against Hobbes and Pufendorf that our moral obligations
have authority because of the internal sanction of a painful conscience. But
Kant, I am arguing, preserves the need for an external imposition of sanctions,
though they are not arbitrary sanctions (KpV V, 130). The fact that we feel
badly if we break the law is not, for him, enough. The presence of these sanctions does not by itself lead to heteronomy, unless the ground for obedience is
the fear of hell or hope of heaven.
47. See MM VI, 340-42. It is significant also that Kant denies that the church
should have a monarchical constitution, Rei. VI, 102.
48. See Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, op. cit., 99 and 127. Note also
R. M. Hare, Sorting Out Ethics, op. cit., 26, The Kingdom of Ends is not really a
kingdom, but a democracy with equality before the law.'
49. J. L. Mackie, f.thies, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1977,45.
50. Lectures on Ethics, op. cit. 79-80. See also ReI. VI, 139.
51. KpV V, 25. There is an apparent difficulty here about whether Kant's
argument is consistent. I have tried to layout the argument in The Moral Cap,
op. cit. ,69-96. Kant wants to say both that we inevitably desire our own happiness and that this desire should be subordinated to duty, which has (as in
Crusius) a separate spring of motivation.
52. This is one of the two ingredients in the matter of morality described in
the Metaphysics of Morals (VI, 385-6).
53. If one holds, like Thomas Reid, that there are many self-evident but logically independent moral axioms, then God is required to ensure their consistency.
54. Kp V V, 36.
55. Kant says that the kingdom of heaven is represented 'not only as being
brought ever nearer in an approach delayed at certain times yet never wholly
interrupted, but also as arriving', ReI. VI, 134.
56. Adams takes the term 'theonomy' from Tillich in the article already
referred to. There are also two important papers, 'A Modified Divine
Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness' and 'Divine Command Metaethics
Modified Again', both of which are reprinted (the second only in part) in
Helm, op. cit. See also Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999. Other contemporary philosophers have defended versions of divine command theory. Baruch A. Brody's views can be found in
'Morality and Religion Reconsidered'. Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, ed.
Baruch A. Brody, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974, 592-603. Philip
Quinn's views can be found in Divine Commal/ds and Moral Requirements,

478

Faith and Philosophy

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. See also Paul Rooney, Divine Command
Morality, Aldershot: Avebury, 1996, and Richard L. Mouw, The God Who
Commands, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1990. For a version of
the present paper in the context of a discussion of Duns Scotus and twentieth
century moral theory, see John E. Hare, God's Call, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2000.
57. Adams, op. cit. Autonomous submission to political authority has the
same structure.
58. Scotus says, nihil volitu11l quin praecognitum, (nothing is willed but what
is pre-cognized), opus oxon. II, d. 25, q. u. n. 19.
59. Schneewind, The Divine Corporation and the History of Ethics', op. cit.

